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Bayne et al. (2020) [1] envision the fasci-
nating possibility that disconnected
hemispheres (through hemispherotomy),
ex cranio brains, and cerebral organoids
may be islands of awareness (IOAs). They
defined IOAs as systems fully discon-
nected from the external surrounding,
both in terms of input (i.e., sensory informa-
tion) and output (i.e., motor responses),
yet capable of conscious experience
(i.e., aware). In order to test whether these
islands are effectively aware, the authors
propose to use measures of human/animal
consciousness that have beenwell validated
in human/animal settings by correlation with
pretheoretical measures of consciousness
(e.g., behavioural reports) or subjective re-
ports (in the case of humans). In particular,
Bayne et al. [1] mention: (i) measures of dy-
namical complexity, capturing both integra-
tion and differentiation of the detected brain
signal, such as the perturbational complexity
index (PCI); and (ii) measures of algorithm
complexity of EEG (i.e., entropy measures),
quantifying the randomness of brain dy-
namics and capturing mainly the differentia-
tion of the recorded brain activity. Two
questions come tomind: one of a theoretical
and one of a methodological kind. (i) Can
subjective experience be collapsed to a 1D
entity (i.e., a certainmeasure of cortical com-
plexity)? (ii) If we accept such reduction, can
measures validated in one context general-
ize to different species and neural systems?If we accept that consciousness, now
generally defined in the literature as
subjective experience, can be assessed
in isolated systems by the mere applicationof a certain measure of cortical complexity,
consciousness is reduced to a 1D
construct, in which an index is equated to
(the capacity for) subjective experience. For
example, let us consider the above-men-
tioned dynamic complexity (DC). DC
operationalises a (phenomenological)
structural property of consciousness, the
integration and differentiation of every con-
scious scene (structural properties of con-
sciousness are those properties common
to all conscious experiences). While suffi-
ciently high values of suchmeasure appear
necessary for consciousness, evidence
that it is sufficient is lacking, as high DC
could be present in unconscious networks
[2]. In fact, consciousness would seem to
possess other structural properties neces-
sary for it to arise: for example, the features
of perspectivalness (subjective first-person
perspective), presentationality (to be in the
present, the experience of ‘nowness’),
and transparency (attentional unavailability
of earlier processing stages) [3]. Perhaps
Bayne et al. [1] do not refer to subjective
experience when speaking about
consciousness in IOAs. In this case, it is
legitimate to wonder what kind of con-
sciousness would be identified if these
systems were to be found dynamically
complex: for example, will they possess a
sense of phenomenal ownership, which
seems necessary for the experience of
suffering [3]? This is crucial for determin-
ing their moral status and regulating our
behaviour toward them legally. Moreover,
DC and entropy measures, quantifying
different aspect of cortical complexity,
may operationalise different phenomeno-
logical properties of conscious experi-
ence, potentially leading to conflicting
interpretations of IOAs' state of con-
sciousness. It is therefore necessary to
specify which measure is to be consid-
ered to define an IOA as such.
Even if we accept the possibility of reducing
consciousness to a certainmeasure of cortical
complexity, we are still faced with the problem
of defining a set of values consistent withT
consciousness. For example, electrically stim-
ulated slices of the occipital cortex show a
slice PCI score of 0.2 [4]; considered to index
unconsciousness in the human PCI context
[5]. Can we conclude that these slabs are un-
conscious? To help answer this question, let
us imagine that human body temperature
would be proposed as a universal index of
health. A specific range of normal temperature
has been set and validated as an index of
human health by correlating it with human be-
haviours (i.e., sickness), such that if a woman
at rest has a temperature of 40°C, we can
conclude she is ill. We now apply this well-
validated index to a bird. Since birds have
an average body temperature of approxi-
mately 40°C, applying our index would
make us conclude that it is sick. Similarly,
the thresholds for (un)consciousness as de-
fined by objective measures might not re-
tain the same meaning when applied to
other systems, without prior calibration.
This calibration, requiring some form of sub-
jective report/pretheoretical measure of
consciousness, is by definition impossible
to obtain in true islands of awareness. This
raises the question whether consciousness
can be quantified without relying on subjec-
tive/behavioural reports in systems very dis-
tant from us. Currently, human (or animal)
consciousness is univocally probed through
the subjective/behavioural reports of the
person (or animal). Bayne and colleagues
concluded that ‘for the first time we might
be able to tell that there is something it is
like to be a disconnected brain without
being able to tell just what it is like’[1],
suggesting the presence of a subjective
experience in IOAs. Or might we instead
have reached the ultimate challenge of con-
sciousness science, that is, to account for
first-person phenomenology from a third-
person perspective?
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philosophical fantasy but should be taken
seriously by the science of consciousness.
The fundamental challenge, concerns the
detection of IOAs. What would count as
to identify IOAs. There are two aspects to
this challenge. The first is whether it is
possible to directly compare values of
complexity that have been derived from
different types of systems. For example,
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good evidence for the presence of an
IOA? We suggest that the most promising
approaches involve complexity measures,
such as the Perturbational Complexity
Index (PCI), and other measures, which
are sensitive to the coexistence of func-
tional differentiation and functional integra-
tion in neural systems. We point to these
one cannot directly compare the values
of the slice-adapted version of PCI (sPCI)
to those validated in humans, in part be-
cause they are currently obtained with dif-
ferent techniques at different scales [8].
Determining what counts as the ‘most
appropriate’ scale for a given system is
challenging, but recent advances in the1Coma Science Group, GIGA-Consciousness, University of
Liège, Liège, Belgium




© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. particular metrics because they go beyond
mere correlation to operationalize explana-
tory relationships between neural dynamics
and phenomenological properties [2,3],
and because they have already been
shown to perform well when assessing
consciousness in patients in whom devas-
tating injuries often result in disconnection
from inputs and outputs [4,5]. Thus, we
propose to use a ‘radar’ that we have
learned to trust to explore the unknown
landscape of completely disconnected
mathematical analysis of multiscale systems
have made progress in addressing it [9,10].
Accompanying these technical consider-
ations is the more general question of
whether it is ever legitimate to apply
markers of consciousness that have
been validated in one population (intact
human beings) to the members of other
populations, such as ex-cranio brains,
disconnected hemispheres, and cerebralReferences
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Our primary aim in writing the aforemen-
tioned paper was to give the notion of an
island of awareness (IOA) some precision,
and to argue that the possibility of IOAs
should not be dismissed as a
brains.
Cecconi et al. [6] raise two interesting issues
in connection with this proposal. The first is
that these measures treat consciousness
as a one-dimensional phenomenon, which,
Cecconi and colleagues argue, is mistaken.
We agree that consciousness is multidi-
mensional [7], but we don’t agree that the
use of complexity measures to detect
consciousness presupposes that it is unidi-
mensional. The key here is to realize that
markers or indicators of consciousness
need not be treated as definitions of con-
sciousness. (Compare: crying is a marker
of pain, but pain is not to be defined in
terms of crying.) Consciousness could be
multidimensional even if certain markers
of it are unidimensional. (Cecconi and
colleagues ask whether we mean to refer
to subjective experience when speaking of
consciousness. We do.)
The second issue that Cecconi et al. raise
concerns the use of complexity measures
organoids. Cecconi et al. appear to an-
swer this question in the negative. We will
confine our response to three points.
First, anyone who is willing to ascribe con-
sciousness to non-human animals faces a
version of this challenge, for the behav-
ioural and neurophysiological markers of
consciousness that we employ to ascribe
consciousness to non-human animals
must themselves be validated with refer-
ence to human beings [11]. Second, the
systems we are considering share many
of the neurophysiological features of the
brains of intact mammals; in particular,
they have neurons and associated biolog-
ical infrastructure. Concerns about the
possible substrate dependency of con-
sciousness can therefore be set aside
[compare, for example, silicon-based arti-
ficial intelligence (AI) systems]. Third, as
we note above and in [1], our validation
strategy appeals to the capacity of the
property in question to explain features
that are associated with consciousness,
starting from its unity and richness. This
approach to validation (i.e., the ‘natural
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